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Even if a comprehensible deal could  
be achieved, for example if the UK 
could negotiate some privileges similar 
to the privileges currently enjoyed  
by Norway, the effect will be a decline  
of around 2% to 3% of GDP 
with the European block. Brexit vote is likely to  
have severe long-term economic implications for 
multinationals around the world which use the UK  
as a base for their operations. Financial firms in the 
UK will not be able to keep passporting rights if UK 
chooses a ‘hard’ Brexit and leaves the single market 
altogether. If these firms lose ‘single passport’ to 
operate in the EU, it may threaten the future of 
London as the centre of financial services and largest 
recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI), which 
is a vital component of the UK’s financial health  
with an estimated stock value of £1 trillion, half of 
which coming from EU countries. The impact of Brexit 
is likely to cause at least 22% fall in FDI, according 
to Dhingra et al. (2016). Consequences of this will 
eventually cascade to the wider economy, damaging 
UK’s productivity and lowering income levels. 
Even if a comprehensible deal could be achieved, 
for example if the UK could negotiate some privileges 
similar to the privileges currently enjoyed by Norway 
– Norway is in the European Economic Area (EEA)  
but not in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
– the effect will be a decline of around 2% to 3%  
of GDP (CEP, 2016). If on the other hand, the UK 
 opts for a ‘Switzerland scenario’ and joins EFTA, 
 the negative effects of Brexit are unlikely to be 
significantly reduced either. It is in fact extremely 
unlikely that the UK will opt for the Swiss or Norwegian 
model because it would have to allow free movement 
of labour. 
Passporting rights
With regards to the passporting rights, Booth 
and Scarpetta (2016) note that financial services 
‘passport’ is not a single issue. There are sectors  
where the passport is more important than in others. 
For instance, the passport is crucial to the wholesale 
and investment banking as almost 20% of the 
banking sector’s annual revenue is estimated to  
be linked to the passport (for example, Deutsche  
Bank gets a fifth of its revenue in the UK). Passport is 
however less important for funds as EU clients’ assets 
are already kept in funds domiciled in Ireland and 
Luxembourg and are simply managed from the UK. 
Only approximately 7% of assets managed in the  
UK would be under direct threat from the loss of  
the passport, according to the estimations in Booth  
and Scarpetta (2016). In their study, the researchers 
also add that insurance business is unlikely to be 
significantly affected if UK loses passporting rights 
because insurance is a global industry and there is  
no single market in insurance in the EU. They indicate 
that ‘up to 87% of insurers operating across borders 
in the EU do so via subsidiaries rather than branches, 
which are reliant on the passport’ (Booth and 
Scarpetta, 2016: 48).
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T he global community has witnessed game changing events in 2016. The shocking 51.8% vote to leave the European Union 
(EU) in the UK (the so-called Brexit), with a turnout 
of 72%, the highest since 1992 in any national 
contest, and the victory of Donald Trump in the 
United States. Both events have triggered a new 
wave of uncertainty on both sides of the Atlantic. 
These outcomes, which are indicative of rising 
populism across the world, have severe implications 
for these countries’ future economic growth. In this 
article, we discuss the economic consequences  
of the Brexit vote for the UK and the implications 
of Brexit on the UK’s legal system.
Economic growth in 2017-2019
UK’s GDP growth will remain fragile in the period 
2017 to 2019 as the country’s exit from Europe is 
being negotiated with its former economic partners. 
The drag in economic growth will mainly come from 
foreign investment in commercial property, and in 
sectors aimed at accessing the EU single market, such 
as automotive and financial services (PwC, 2016). 
Decline in business investment is mainly driven by the 
uncertainty about the UK’s future trading relationship 
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Access to the single market and free movement 
of labour 
The vote to leave the EU was triggered to a large 
extent by the desire of the British voters to limit 
the free movement of EU citizens into the UK. The 
following migration statistics do not justify the vote  
of the British people to leave the EU. 
During the twelve months up until March 2015, 
net migration was estimated to be 330,000, which 
exceeded the previous highest level estimated for 
June 2005 of 320,000. In respect of the issue of  
EU vs non-EU migration, the data from the Office of 
National Statistics (ONS) shows that net migration for 
EU citizens was estimated to be 184,000 in December 
2015 compared with 174,000 in December 2014. 
The apparent increase in EU net migration was in fact 
largely due to the increase in net migration of EU2 
citizens (comprising Romania and Bulgaria), while  
net migration of EU15 (comprising Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Irish 
Republic, Italy (including The Vatican), Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) and EU8 
citizens (comprising Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) 
remained relatively stable. As for the non-EU citizens, 
in December 2015, the net migration number was 
188,000, a level in line with the 194,000 non-EU 
immigrants in the previous year (ONS, 2016). 
It is important to note that although inflows 
from the EU have increased much more rapidly 
compared to the non-EU migration, migrants from 
non-EU countries account for the larger share of  
the migration (see Figure 1 adapted from the ONS). 
Furthermore, EU migration is primarily work-related 
and, according to Dustmann and Frattini (2014),  
has contributed £20bn to UK public finance between 
2000 and 2011 as tax payments by European 
migrants far outweigh the cost of welfare. 
Although it is early days to assess the 
consequences of leaving the single market, it is clear 
that the economic advantages of participating in  
free movement of people will be lost. Firms may  
lose access to the wider supply of skills which would 
damage productivity. The tax revenues collected  
by the UK government may decrease if some jobs 
remain unoccupied. Finally, innovation and spread  
of ideas may slow down. It is also clear that costs  
will be borne disproportionately across the UK. For 
example, restrictions on the freedom of movement 
will be felt more heavily in Scotland which is already 
facing demographic challenges as its population ages.
Could the UK choose Norway and Switzerland 
as a potential exit models?
Immigration and lack of border controls are 
increasingly cited as the main reasons for leaving the 
EU. It is highly unlikely that Norway or Switzerland 
could serve as models for the UK after an EU exit. 
Although these countries do operate under slightly 
different legal arrangements from the UK’s when it 
comes to EU migration, in practice, these countries are 
fully integrated into the EU’s free movement rules. FIGURE 1: Net Long-Term International Migration by citizenship, United Kingdom, 1975 to 2015. Source: ONS
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Confusion persists on three main 
issues: the fragile and complex 
constitutional settlement of the UK; 
what kind of country the UK wants 
to be post-Brexit; and what future 
relations it wants to secure with the EU
Furthermore, if the UK chooses the Switzerland 
scenario to enjoy tariff-free access to the EU in 
goods, it will still have no passporting rights to 
operate in the EU; Swiss financial firms still require 
special permissions to operate in the EU. Thus, the 
Swiss model is unlikely to be a solution London 
would want. Those models would not address the 
issue of EU immigration, as both Switzerland and 
Norway have far higher levels of EU immigration 
than the UK as a proportion of their populations. 
For the UK had the same net EU immigration rate 
as Switzerland, it would mean nearly 400,000 
more EU migrants a year (Eurostat, 2012).
Uncertainty persists 
The terms of the UK’s departure from the  
EU will be the most important topic for the UK in 
2017-2019. Questions will be raised about the precise 
nature of the separation. Article 50 of the Lisbon 
Treaty – the legal mechanism that triggers a country’s 
exit from the EU – has never been triggered before, 
and it is unclear how it is supposed to work in practice. 
Confusion therefore persists on three main issues:  
the fragile and complex constitutional settlement  
of the UK; what kind of country the UK wants to 
be post-Brexit; and what future relations it wants to 
secure with the EU. More certainty is required, 
especially for the City of London because the financial 
sector dislikes uncertainty as investors are looking to 
shift investments away from UK to continental Europe 
and major financial firms (e.g. HSBC, J.P.Morgan) are 
considering relocating their activities in anticipation of 
a ‘hard Brexit.’ 
What does Brexit mean for the international 
commercial world?
Brexit has shaken up the international commercial 
world in a manner that has yet to be fully understood. 
A regulation of European financial market law 
prohibits providers of financial service from the third 
countries (countries outside the EU) from agreeing  
a place of jurisdiction or arbitration procedure in 
third countries. Any agreement with London as the 
place of jurisdiction or arbitration should be amended  
in favour of other countries where distinct official 
powers have the authority to make legal decisions 
and judgments. This has an immediate effect on 
the market segments of banking, capital market and 
insurance law, where London courts are a hub for the 
majority of disputes in the European judicial area 
(Hess, 2016). Moreover, judgments in the British 
courts will no longer be automatically enforceable 
in the European Union after Brexit, as Article 36 of the 
Regulation (EU) number 1215/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(Recast) (Brussels I Regulation 1215/2012) only 
applies to ‘a judgment given by the courts of  
a Member State’. 
Furthermore, Brexit means a loss in European 
legal culture. Civil law tradition and legal practice, 
inter alia, of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU), are faced with the concept of common 
law. These judgments to a great extent are based 
upon previous court rulings whilst common law is 
developed through judicial interpretation unlike the 
civil law tradition of continental Europe. This means 
that ‘the power of argument of British lawyers  
will represent a loss, and the dogmatic but equally 
pragmatic approach of common law for achieving 
feasible solutions will leave gaps’ (Hess, 2016: 2). 
What does Brexit mean for international 
commercial arbitration?
International arbitration is safe from the legal 
uncertainty created by Brexit as EU legislation does 
not apply to international arbitration; this aspect has 
never been regulated or harmonized at the EU level. 
Brussels I Regulation on jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters has excluded arbitration from its scope  
of application. The New York Convention on  
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Awards remains in place even within the EU.  
The most important advantage of arbitration is  
its enforceability, whereas enforcement of court 
judgments abroad may not be straightforward  
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In the long run, however, London as  
a preferred place of arbitration may 
be affected by any decline in London’s 
position as a global business centre 
post-Brexit
in the absence of a specific enforcement treaty. 
Jurisprudence of the CJEU has impact on 
international arbitration in the EU. After Brexit, English 
courts will not be bound by CJEU’s case law (Murray, 
2016); anti-suit injunctions that prevent a party from 
pursuing abusive court proceedings in an EU Member 
State will be dispensed by English courts (see Allianz 
SpA and Others v West Tankers Inc, Case C-185/07). 
However, some argue that injunctions are already 
permissible under the Brussels I Regulation (Cannon, 
2016). And like Swiss courts, English courts will not  
be bound to sanction an arbitration award that  
is contrary to EU public policy. English law is usually 
chosen for reasons unconnected with the UK’s 
present membership in the EU; English law is used 
because of its well developed and reputable case-law, 
and its transparency and predictability, providing 
freedom of contract, and a pro-business approach.
In summary, the impact of Brexit on 
international arbitration practices will be minimal. In 
the short-term, it is unlikely that the use of arbitration 
and of London as a preferred place of business  
will change. In the long run, however, London as  
a preferred place of arbitration may be affected by  
any decline in London’s position as a global business 
centre post-Brexit.
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Conclusion
Britain’s exit from the EU will constitute a 
significant loss for the EU, and although there are 
certain areas which will not be affected by the Brexit 
vote – such as international commercial arbitration 
– Brexit will also have serious consequences for the  
UK’s economy, especially for the City of London, as 
mentioned in this article. The Centre for Economic 
Performance (2016) and the National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research (2016) estimates that 
the UK economy will be between 1% and 3% smaller 
by 2020, and between 2% and 8% smaller by 2030, 
than if the UK has chosen to stay in the EU (Dhingra 
et al. 2016; Ebell and Warren, 2016). A 1% drop in 
GDP is a fall of £19 billion, equivalent to £720 for each 
household currently in the UK. Although it is possible 
that losses for the UK might be mitigated (e.g. if EU 
leaders negotiate a good deal for the City of London 
recognising the risk to financial stability across the  
EU as a whole) – it is clear that the risk to economic 
growth of an exit strategy driven by immigration 
control are serious.
If the EU does not offer the UK favorable  
exit terms, it is difficult in the current global 
macroeconomic and political climate to predict  
what leverage Britain will have with its European 
neighbours. Indeed, the strong reluctance on the part 
of continental Europe to acknowledge the crises of 
immigration facing the EU may be driving the desire 
to be harsh on the UK in order to deter other EU  
exits. If this is the case, the UK economic model may 
change. As suggested by the British Prime Minister 
Theresa May, Britain may aggressively cut taxes and 
red tape, if it does not secure favourable fast-track 
trade deals with the EU (FT, 2017).
At the time of writing, it appears that Britain 
will not seek continued single market membership 
but will rather try to negotiate a free-trade 
agreement with the EU. This ‘smart’ Brexit approach 
has already generated a negative reaction from 
some EU leaders who are invoking European values, 
and the indissoluble link between free movement 
and trade agreements. The UK will need to exert 
outstanding negotiating skills – and possibly a 
degree of luck - to secure its ambitious Brexit plan. 
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